Interpreting discrete-choice models

Are individuals random-utility maximizers? Or do individuals have private knowledge of shocks to their utility?

“McFadden (1974) observed that the logit, probit, and similar discrete-choice models have two interpretations. The first interpretation is that of individual random utility. A decisionmaker draws a utility function at random to evaluate a choice situation. The distribution of choices then reflects the distribution of utility, which is the object of econometric investigation. The second interpretation is that of a population of decision makers. Each individual in the population has a deterministic utility function. The distribution of choices in the population reflects the population distribution of preferences. … One interpretation of this game theoretic approach is that the econometrician confronts a population of random-utility maximizers whose decisions are coupled. These models extend the notion of Nash equilibrium to random- utility choice. The other interpretation views an individual’s shock as known to the individual but not to others in the population (or to the econometrician). In this interpretation, the Brock-Durlauf model is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of a game with independent types, where the type of individual i is the pair (x_i, e_i). Information is such that the first component of each player i’s type is common knowledge, while the second is known only to player i.” — Blume, Brock, Durlauf & Ioannides. 2011. Identification of Social Interactions. Handbook of Social Economics, Volume 1B.